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CASE NOTES
taxes. An unfortunate result of the emphasis in the Second Circuit on its
qualified gross income rule, however, is the picture it may present of casual
handling by the courts of other difficult and important compensatory vari-
ables when they are considered in combination with the income tax question."
SAMUEL E. SHAW II
Government Contracts—"Team" Projects—Prime Contractor's Relation
to Subcontractor—Joint Enterprise.—Air Technology Corp. v. General
Elec. Co.'--In 1961 General Electric (GE) began preparing a proposal to
the Air Force for the establishment of a nuclear detection system. Represen-
tatives of GE and Air Technology (AT), discussed the possibility of GE in-
corporating AT's design of the EM sensor subsystem 2 in a "team" proposal
to the Air Force if AT could demonstrate that Air Force accuracy require-
ments had been met. For "team" membership, GE required that AT (1)
justify to GE the scientific basis for its EM sensor design, (2) assist in pre-
paring and presenting the proposal to the Air Force, and (3) submit, at GE's
request, a properly priced proposal for the EM sensor subsystem. AT ful-
filled its first requirement without imposing proprietary restrictions on the
included data. At about this time, GE informed the Air Force that AT was a
"team member" and subcontractor of GE's. GE then submitted its proposal
to the Air Force including material contained in AT's proposal to it. Subse-
quently, AT fulfilled its second team membership requirement by assisting
GE in orally presenting its proposal to the Air Force. The Air Force then
selected GE as prime contractor, provided a suitable contract could be nego-
tiated. GE was not selected on the basis of its proposal, which was not
completely acceptable technically, but rather on a statement of its expected
performance. During negotiations with the Air Force, AT informed GE
that it " 'expected a sole source procurement from GE on the EM sensor.' "3
GE, however, after successfully negotiating the prime contract, solicited
competitive bids for the EM sensor from a number of companies including
AT, and ultimately decided to build part of the EM subsystem itself. AT
brought this bill in equity to restrain GE from using sensor information
44 Compare the technique used effectively in Nollenberger v. United Air Lines Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1963), where eleven special interrogatories allowed the
court to compute the award as the sum of five items (of several steps each), under the
provisions of Rule 49(b), F.R. Civ. P. The variables of income taxes on earnings and on
yield from the award and inflation were included explicitly.
1 1964 Mass, Adv. Sh. 949, 199 N,E,2d 538 (1964).
2
 Nuclear explosions generate various types of radiated effects, including optical,
acoustical, seismic and electromagnetic; measurement of the different effects is accom-
plished by means of sensing devices called "sensors," optical radiation being measured by
optical sensors, and electromagnetic radiation by electromagnetic (EM) sensors. The
contract finally awarded by the Air Force to GE stipulated the use of EM sensors and
required that they be capable of determining the direction and measuring the yield, or
magnitude, of nuclear detonations.
8 Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 954, 199 N.E.2d, at
543.
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supplied to it by AT and sought damages on grounds that GE breached its
trust to AT. The lower court denied injunctive relief but found for AT on
the issue of damages for breach of trust. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed on the issue of damages and remanded for their
recomputation and to allow AT to amend its pleadings to conform to the
proof. The court HELD: Even though there was no joint venture there was
a joint undertaking and GE is liable for depriving AT of a valuable business
opportunity, GE's liability being predicated upon its contractual responsi-
bility to AT as a team member.
Modern defense systems are generally complex and rapidly rendered ob-
solete. The federal government, in keeping pace with advancing technology
often makes its defense needs known to private enterprise and invites it to
propose how these needs might best be met. The extreme complexity of these
systems may require the association of several companies in the submission
of a comprehensive proposal. The relationship of the United States Govern-
ment with private defense firms has created a developing body of "govern-
ment contract" law.4
In the absence of a clear federal rule of decision, it may be difficult to
ascertain whether federal or local law should govern suits involving govern-
ment contracts. The basic consideration is whether or not there exists a
sufficient federal interest in the litigation to warrant the application of feder-
al law.5 The United States Supreme Court has indicated that such a federal
interest exists in suits involving commercial paper issued by the Govern-
ment,° government savings bonds, 7 and government contracts to which the
United States is a party.s Even in cases involving a great federal interest,
however, the applicable state law is held to govern essentially private as-
pects of the transaction .° The Ninth Circuit, in American Pipe & Steel Corp.
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.," nevertheless recently required the applica-
tion of federal law to a dispute between a prime contractor and subcontractor
on a government contract. This represented the furthest extension of the
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States". doctrine that a sufficient federal in-
terest requires the application of federal law.
There was no allegation of a federal interest in the instant case and the
court, without discussing its reasons for doing so, construed the agreement
in the light of New York law, the agreement having been entered into in New
York, and Massachusetts law, since no argument was made that the New
4 See Paul, United States Government Contracts & Subcontracts 6-7, 331-32 (1964).
5 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
6
 Ibid.
7 See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n
v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956) (dictum).
8 See Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. County
of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) ; Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1963).
9 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, supra note 7, at 33.
10 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961), noted in 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1656 (1962), 61 Colum.
L. Rev. 1519 (1961).
11 Supra note 5.
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York and Massachusetts law substantially differed in any relevant respects."
This appears to be a correct application of local law since there was no
government subcontract actually in issue as there was in American Pipe &
Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co." Consequently, the transaction
between GE and AT could reasonably be regarded as of such an essentially
private nature that local law should govern 14
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)," however,
might be deemed to so dominate the legal relations of parties contracting
with a view toward obtaining a government contract that federal law should
apply." These regulations were published in the Federal Register, thereby
placing parties whose legal relations might be affected, on notice as to their
contents.0
 The undertaking of GE and AT might thus be construed as fol-
lows: GE and AT represented themselves to the Air Force as prime contrac-
tor and subcontractor;" they are held to notice of the federal requirement
that a prime contractor use competition to the greatest practicable extent in
placing subcontracts." Consequently, GE's seeking competitive bids from
other companies and itself on the EM sensor would be no breach of duty on
GE's part. There is no indication that AT's design was incorporated in
GE's EM sensor as finally approved by the Air Force, but even if it were, the
proper way for AT to protect itself was to affix proprietary restrictions to the
data supplied.
Rejecting plaintiff's theory that GE was liable for its breach of trust
arising from the parties' status as joint venturers, the court found that a
"joint venture within that indefinite term's ordinary usage" was not indi-
cated by the facts, but that there existed "a more limited joint undertaking by
GE and AT, as team members." 2° (Emphasis added.) The court also con-
cluded that GE breached its duty by competing with AT for the EM sensor
work and by failing to press for AT's continued participation in the pro-
gram.21
 This duty was in the nature of a trust arising out of the contract for
a joint undertaking. It is submitted that the court could have taken this op-
portunity to clarify the "nebulous concept "22 of joint venture rather than
distinguishing joint ventures from joint undertakings with resultant fidu-
ciary duties. The court could conceivably have reached the same result by
applying modern "joint venture" law.
The joint venture, at common law, was regarded as merely an informal
12 Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 959-60, 199 N.E.2d,
at 546-47, n.13.
13 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961) supra note 10.
14 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, supra note 7.
15 32 C.E.R. §§ 1.100-30.5 (1961).
16 See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
17 Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947).
18 Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 953, 199 N.E.2d, at
32 C.E.R. (ASPR) § 1.300-1 (1961).
Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 960, 199 N.E.2d, at
Id. at 961, 199 N.E.2d, at 547-48.
Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 687, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
542.
19
20
547.
21
1962).
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partnership relating to a specific undertaking" and governed by the same
rules as an ordinary partnership. 24
 As a separate legal concept it was un-
known at common law" and in early American decisions 2 8 Later American
decisions tried to distinguish partnerships and joint ventures, 27 and the
modern trend of American decisions is to recognize the separate nature of the
joint venture. As a result, the joint venture, as a distinct legal entity, has
been declared to be " 'purely the creature of our American courts,' "28 and is
still in the process of development." The courts have not evolved any clear-
cut definition of joint venture, being content with a case-by-case adjudica-
tion of whether a given fact situation constitutes the relationship.3°
The requirement of a contractual basis for the existence of a joint ven-
ture is generally accepted.St This contract must be express or implied in fact
from the parties' conduct." The instant court construed the actions of GE
and AT as indicating a contract for a joint undertaking," thus establishing
the required contractual basis.
A joint venture contract usually embraces a specific undertaking. 34
Though the court did not discuss it, the facts indicate this characteristic of
the parties' association. It is not enough, however, "that two parties have
agreed together to act in concert to achieve some stated economic objec-
tive."35 There must also be a sharing of the profits and losses of the yen-
ture.33 Both GE and AT obviously shared the risk of losing both their time
and effort in the joint undertaking. While, however, the court was correct in
concluding that AT was not to share in the profits of the prime contract"
per se and refusing to recognize a joint venture, it is possible that AT's ex-
pected profit under the subcontract might be construed as a sufficient share
in the profits of the prime contract to warrant finding the relationship of
joint adventurers. The mode of participation "in the fruits of the undertaking
23 See Lesser v. Smith, 115 Conn. 86, 89, 160 Atl. 302, 304 (1932) (dictum).
24 See Lindley, Treatise on the Law of Partnership 10-12 (10th ed. 1935).
25 See Chapman v. Dwyer, 40 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1930).
20 See The Swallow, 23 Fed. Cas. 491 (No. 13,665) (S,D.N.Y. 1846).
27 See Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 Va. L. Rev. 425, 444 (1950) and cases cited
therein.
28
 Rowe v. Brooks, 329 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1964); see also Aiken Mills v. United
States, 144 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1944).
28 See First Mechanics Bank v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1937).
88 See Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., supra note 22.
81
 See Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 512 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Berwin v. Cable, 313
Mass. 431, 435, 47 N,E.2d 951, 954 (1943) ; Edgerly v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 287
Mass. 238, 243, 191 N.E. 415, 417 (1934).
82
 Tompkins v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 1938).
83 Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 959, 199 N.E.2d, at
546.
84 See Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 253 (D. Mass. 1956).
85 See Hasday v. Barocas, 115 N.Y.S.2d 209, 216 {1952).
88 See Davis v. Webster, 198 N.E.2d 883, 887 (Ind. 1964); Baker v. Billingsley, 126
Ind. App. 703, 132 N.E.2d 273 (1956).
ST Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 960, 199 N.E.2d, at
547.
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may be left to the agreement of the parties"" and they could arguably have
chosen the subcontract device as their method of sharing the profits.
It is usually required that joint adventurers have a mutual right of con-
trol over the carrying out of the joint transaction.au Equality of control,
however, is not necessarily required among joint adventurers and a recent
case has suggested that mere consultation of the lesser controlling partner
shows a sufficient element of control on his part for the existence of a joint
venture." Such a degree of control existed in the instant case by virtue of the
frequent consultations and close working arrangements between GE and AT
in submitting the proposal.
The majority of jurisdictions require the existence of some sort of mutual
agency for a joint venture, while the minority view requires no such agency. 41
The court in the instant case made no specific finding on the question of
agency, while indicating that the parties had no occasion to use any such
agency powers as might have existed A 2
More important than control or scope of agency powers is the question
of the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. If two parties
are co-adventurers, they owe each other the utmost good faith and loyalty."
This duty of trust is a consequence of an existing joint venture stai us. The
court, after stating that a "joint undertaking," but not a "joint venture,"
existed, held that GE had breached its fiduciary duties to AT. Since fiduciary
duties flow from each of these associations, "joint venture" and "joint under-
taking" are indistinguishable in this respect. Apparently, the fiduciary under-
takings of GE and AT were tacitly examined under developing joint venture
law.
Parties contemplating the formation of any joint association for ob-
taining government contracts should remember that courts have used the con-
cept of joint venture where none in fact existed, "as a device for doing jus-
tice."44 Unfortunately, actions which may be completely fair and equitable
under government contract law may seem unjust under ordinary contract
principles." In order to avoid the improper application of joint venture law
38 Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 764, 128 P.2d
665, 673 (1942).
80 See Wagner v. Derecktor, 306 N.Y. 386, 390, 118 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1954).
Kleinschmidt v. United States, supra note 34, at 256.
41 See, e.g., the majority view in Roberts v. Craig, 124 Cal. App. 2d 202, 208, 268
P.2d 500, 504 (1954); contra, Wrenn v. Moskin, 226 App. Div. 563, 235 N.Y.S. 405 (1929);
See Jaeger, Partnership or Joint Venture? 37 Notre Dame Law. 138, 153 (1961).
42 Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1, at 960, 199 N.E.2d, at
547, n.15.
43 Flint v. Codman, 247 Mass. 463, 471, 142 N.E. 256, 258-59 (1924); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
44 Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture, 41 Cornell L.Q. 640, 652 (1956)
and cases cited therein.
45 It is possible that GE in good faith only intended to give AT an opportunity to
bid on the EM sensor subsystem with the expectation that AT would be the successful
bidder since AT had essentially written the specifications for the subsystem by virtue of its
participation in the proposal activity. None of GE's actions were such as would un-
equivocally negate the existence of such an intent on the part of GE and this position
would be entirely consistent with GE's carrying out its affirmative duty of placing sub-
contracts on a competitive basis to the greatest practicable extent.
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to such seeming injustices, and to inform courts of their actual intent,
parties associating themselves for the purpose of obtaining government con-
tracts should be careful to characterize their undertaking in writing and to
further stipulate their rights and duties. Care should be taken that their
agreement cannot be construed as contravening the spirit or the letter of
federal procurement law. In the event the parties enter into some form of
joint undertaking, they should expressly determine, as definitely as possible,
the subject matter of their agreement, how long their association will last,
and at what point their association will cease. Even after the undertakings
have been spelled out, a party should take care to acquire sufficient docu-
mentation to prove that he (usually the prime contractor) is justified in
terminating some aspect of the association and embarking upon a course of
action inconsistent with the prior, and now terminated, relationship.
This long and expensive litigation could have been avoided had GE and
AT more definitely specified the character and terms of their relationship.
Since this was not done, the court was called upon to construe the parties'
undertakings from their actions. The court could have clarified developing
"joint venture" law by more thoroughly examining the parties' conduct under
present law governing such associations, rather than elaborating its theory
of "joint undertaking."
JOHN F. O'LEARY
Interstate and Foreign Commerce—Power of the States to Regulate
Traffic in Intoxicating Liquor.—Defrartment of Revenue v. James B.
Beam Distillery; 1
 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. 2—
The United States Supreme Court recently handed down two decisions de-
fining the right of the states, under the twenty-first amendment, to regulate
commerce in intoxicating liquors within their boundaries. The amendment
provides in its second section: "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 3
Although both cases deal with a reduction of state powers under the amend-
ment, they involve interpretation of two separate constitutional provisions in
relation to the amendment. Beam involves the effect of the amendment on the.
import-export clause, 4 while Hostetter concerns the impact of the amendment
1 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
2 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
3 U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.
4 U.S. Const. art. I, 10, d. 2:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control
of Congress.
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